Brin Najžer in his book, The Hybrid Age – International Security in the Era of Hybrid Warfare, offers his view in an effort to explain a new phenomenon that appeared during the last years in the vocabulary of politicians, military and academics. As he points out, hybrid warfare has not an international accepted definition of what it is and many times it has been used in a wrong way. In the above framework, he tries to give a strategic overview and to clarify the phenomenon of hybrid warfare in a concise and strategic manner.
In this vein, he wishes to demystify hybrid warfare and also give it an overarching strategic umbrella which can be understood by the career academic dealing with abstract definitional issues; the political decision maker, who has to decide how best to counter-hybrid warfare threatening their constituents; the news reporter who is covering a hybrid conflict zone; and the individual soldier or officer who has to deal with the threat on the ground.
In his introduction, he refers to the continuous evolution of war throughout history and how during this process the last two decades, a new and complex phenomenon called hybrid warfare arise. Because of certain distinct characteristics from other forms of modern warfare, hybrid is a challenge that confuses policymakers and security experts, while giving the actors that employ it a new way of achieving their goals in the face of long-standing Western conventional, doctrinal and strategic superiority. As a new concept, a complex and important development in policy, security and probably other fields related studies, it needs further study to define it accurately, to explore the ways in which it has been applied and to assess if hybrid warfare will change the future of conflict.
His approach is twofold. First, he tries to create a rigorous definition and build a framework for further debate about and scrutiny of the phenomenon. Second, he applies that theoretical framework to a series of practical examples in order to establish the validity of the approach. The goal is to establish, and present, a unified theory of hybrid warfare which can then be applied to any case study. Furthermore, he wants to contribute to the field by proposing a theory, definition, framework and practical policy guidelines on the conduct and impact of hybrid warfare.
The study of hybrid warfare in this book, takes place from a theoretical perspective based on the discipline of international relations (IR), remains rooted in the realist paradigm and fits within the security sub-field of IR. In addition, this book seeks to cut through the securitization perception of hybrid warfare and examine the phenomenon in a more focused and rigorous, strategic way. The main thrust of this book will focus on the question: What is hybrid warfare and how does it work? He accepts that contemporary international order, is in nature Western liberal democratic tradition and hybrid warfare is a tool of actors which, because of their own concepts of just arrangements and the distribution of power, seek to revise the international order.
The structure of the book includes, the introduction, seven chapters and the conclusion. The chapters are grouped in two blocks, the first sets up the definitional and contextual basis of the concept and the second deals with the practical aspects of hybrid warfare. The concluding chapter summarizes the key points, presents the findings and answers the research questions set out in the Introduction.
To place the foundation of the theory of hybrid warfare the author starts with the discipline of International Relations, why the international system is based on conflict and coercion, and how someone will have to find answers within the field of IR when a new kind of war-related phenomenon emerges. He also emphasizes the fact that Strategic studies, a sub-field of security studies, is an important and finely focused speciality of IR which he chooses to develop his thinking. As he moves forward, he presents the causes of war starting from Thucydides till modern day realities and hybrid warfare, where it can be said to be a form of conflict that suits an international order which does not wish its members to engage in large-scale war but nevertheless gives states the means to achieve their aims through a distinctive brand of coercion.
In an attempt to combine realist theory and hybrid warfare, he names the political use of coercion as a primary tool of hybrid warfare and puts its natural habitat within the realist domain. Towards a theory of hybrid warfare, he uses two levels of characteristics that influence an occurrence of hybrid warfare, systemic (the anarchy of the international system) and individual (coming from the actors). Taking into consideration the above context, as hybrid warfare is a low-level conflict to which actors’ resort when outright war is undesirable, it can be used by a less powerful state, or state-like actor, to challenge a more powerful one, or between two lesser powers. Each state’s perception of its own power will influence the choice of tools, but hybrid warfare offers a very useful alternative that is both innovative enough to achieve the element of surprise and contains enough of the familiar concept of coercion through military force that it can be applied with relative ease.
Moving further, he studies the definition of hybrid warfare, the origins of both parts of the term “hybrid warfare” and offers his own definition. In this chapter the author tries also to define the various terms associated with hybrid warfare, in order to create a core vocabulary with which to furnish the remainder of this book. As he walks through the evolution of the concept, he mentions the establishment of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE) an Institution born due to this phenomenon as a step in the right direction and closing he offers a definition building on previous work, which is:
«Hybrid warfare is a distinct form of low-level conflict spanning the spectrum of capabilities. It is a deliberately opaque merger of conventional and unconventional warfare and conducted under a single central authority and direction of a state and/or state-like actor. The aim of hybrid warfare is to achieve political objectives that would not be achievable, or would incur too high a cost, through the use of either form individually. The blend of conventional and unconventional enables the actor to exploit an opponent’s strategic or doctrinal weakness while maintaining deniability and strategic surprise». After this definition he articulates the terms used in the definition and require closer scrutiny.
The debate over how warfare of the future will look and in order to examine what makes hybrid distinctive the author moves the interest to Fourth Generation Warfare and compound wars. From the one hand the theory of 4GW focuses solely on insurgency as the dominant form of future war and as insurgencies never take place in a stateless vacuum the theory of 4GW has been doomed from the start. On the other hand, the concept of compound wars does not include non-state actors or more modern threats like cyber warfare, nor does it account for the flexibility of hybrid forces. Compound war was a largely obscure term, until it re-surfaced in connection with its modern derivative, hybrid war. A precursor in spirit if not entirely in application or meaning, it is now largely outdated and subsumed under the umbrella of hybrid.
Complexity has always been a part of warfare and a combination of irregular and regular units fighting in the same campaign has been a staple of war since the dawn of civilisation. This aspect of hybrid is not new but the way the two parts interact is novel. The fusion, together with the opportunities and difficulties it presents, of conventional and unconventional is a new kind of warfare, but not a new form of war. The main reason for dismissing the historical examples as truly hybrid is the fact that a hybrid force, possessed of the ability to rapidly transform from one form to another, requires real-time communication and flexibility that were simply not available before the era of mass communication.
After the examination of the definition, the author expands the hybrid vocabulary by explaining some other terms associated with the concept such as Hybrid threat, Hybrid Strategy, Counter-Hybrid warfare (CHW) and Hybrid defence. He concludes in this way the effort to clear up the confusion surrounding the definition of hybrid warfare, to place the term into its proper context and to clarify the terminology that surrounds the phenomenon.
Brin Najžer as a next step places a hybrid framework in which there are two crucial pillars: the rules-based, Western led international order and the closely related, Clausewitzian understanding of the nature and character of war. Starting from the assumption that states, and their institutional groupings, are the highest legitimate and legal sources of authority in an otherwise anarchical system, he argues that since the turn of the century, the international order is once again moving towards multipolarity. He takes the Clausewitzian “trinity” (the people, the military and the government) that has maintained its value to the present day, adds to that the famous dictum, where war is ‘merely the continuation of politics by other means’ and transforms the “trinity” to “quinity” adding the elements of external legitimacy and allies, as a response to fully fledged prerequisites for the conduct of war in today’s hybrid age.
In this context, he claims that the traditional concept of the trinity is no longer sufficient, every actor within the system has to operate with two parallel frameworks, internal and external. The original trinity is internal to an individual actor, be it state or non-state. However, the external framework, the quinity, supersedes the internal one through its adoption and application as part of the international order itself. At its core hybrid warfare is purely trinitarian, however because it must now be conducted in a quinitarian environment, it must endeavour to be opaque. It can be argued that hybrid warfare represents the most efficient way of challenging the international order and its guardians without having to completely destroy the system itself. Since the guardian powers will only conduct a military intervention if the quinitarian requirements are met, the hybrid opponent can pursue their own goals with relatively little risk, providing that the conflict does not escalate to the point where it would become a profound challenge to the vital interests of the system and its guardians.
Furthermore, in an effort to bridge the gap between the theoretical approaches of the preceding chapters and the case study chapters he tries to operationalize the theoretical framework by combining it with a review of the defence policies of the leading great powers within the international order. He takes as examples U.S.A., the U.K., Israel, Russia and Japan as states that have faced or in the near future could face opponents utilizing hybrid warfare and builds his argument in order to identify ‘weak spots’ which a hybrid strategy aims to exploit, he looks how these states define, or whether they define, hybrid warfare and how this definition affects their policymaking.
As a strategy is a bridge towards the future and provides guide viewing new concepts and emerging threats, he analyses policies and doctrines of the above-mentioned states and, identifies common themes such as: primacy of conventional threats, brief mentions of terrorism, attempts to achieve more with less and the increasing inclusion of non-security-related issues.
Going forward he offers a unified theory of hybrid warfare based on all the elements of a given phenomenon, as well as possible future additions, into a coherent whole and this includes: the notion of exploitation of weak spots, a clear delineation between the conventional ‘box’ and the unconventional ‘box’ and how Hybrid warfare is based on the deliberate and opaque merger between conventional and unconventional modes of warfare, hybrid warfare is specific to an environment and a timeframe in which it takes place and the vulnerability of the democratic system of governance.
He closes the first block of his book trying to explain why and how hybrid warfare can succeed by answering in a simple way, because states have allowed it to succeed, primarily through the creation of, and ideological adherence to, a rules-based quinitarian international order. Finally, he points out that the difference between past non-hybrid conflicts and future hybrid ones is that it is practically impossible to determine whether they are mostly conventional or mostly unconventional; they are both.
The second block of the book illustrates and examines the cases of Hezbollah and State-like hybrid warfare, Russia and hybrid warfare and China with the non-kinetic maritime hybrid warfare. He starts with the thirty-four-day conflict between Israel and Hezbollah the definitive beginning of the trend towards hybrid warfare, where it was demonstrated that a non-state actor could effectively, and with some degree of success, engage a state actor almost as an equal in strategic terms.
He analyses the historic context, Israel-Lebanon relations between 1982 and 2006, the rise of Hezbollah, the timeline of the war and how it was considered the first example of hybrid warfare, the state-like nature of Hezbollah, its use of advanced technology, Israel’s difficulties in establishing the nature of the conflict and the information war. He closes the first part, defining the incident as early hybrid warfare where the hallmarks of Hezbollah’s brand of hybrid warfare appeared and how this war provoked two in-depth inquiries in Israel in order to correct the deficiencies, adjust doctrines and proceed to the required changes.
The next chapter examines what influenced the Russian hybrid warfare strategy and how it is applied, as from the one hand Russia was a target of hybrid warfare in the two Chechen and the Georgian wars, whereas from the other undertook the role of practitioner in the case of Ukraine.
The Chechnya case is so distinctive due to five important elements: information operations, the use of advanced technology, the rapid and sudden mobilization and de-mobilization, the semi-conventional nature of Chechen forces and the policy of Chechenization. By analysing these elements, the author puts the first piece in the puzzle in the effort to shape the Russian hybrid warfare strategy, the war in Georgia and its hybrid elements such as information operations, cyber warfare and the use of local separatists and proxies, adds another piece in the puzzle and closes the first half where Russia was a target of hybrid warfare.
The second half about Russia comes from the Hybrid warfare in Ukraine, a conflict which cemented the concept of hybrid warfare into the lexicon of strategy as Russia this time became the experienced actor of hybrid warfare approaches. That being said, a timeline of the case in Ukraine is presented with its peculiarities, the seizing of Crimea as an extremely well-organized and executed example of hybrid warfare is analysed and especially three important aspects: the use of the ‘little green men’, information operations, and the overall strategic rationale.
The hallmarks of Russian hybrid warfare are concluded with the conflict in eastern Ukraine and it can be said that Russia has been selectively successful in applying the lessons it learnt in previous conflicts. Finally, the study about Russia ends with the statement that its approach can be said to have become an archetype of hybrid warfare which is not merely theoretical and has also been proven in the field. While other actors might emulate and adapt the concept to suit their own particular needs or their strategic environment, the basic premises to a successful hybrid approach have been established.
The last chapter examines, how a switch to a maritime domain affects the conduct and strategy of hybrid warfare in an environment that is fundamentally different from the previous examples, particularly in South China Sea. As the focus turns on Chinese actions and activities in the region, it places hybrid warfare in naval context and studies how the maritime environment impacts the conduct of Chinese hybrid maritime warfare based on three main aspects: island building, the maritime militia and lawfare. In the beginning there is an analysis about the special characteristics of the maritime domain, the term “sea power”, naval power as component of sea power and the importance of the sea. After that the author moves forward with maritime strategy the key link between, and a major component of, sea power and naval power, all of which serve in a Clausewitzian way a policy objective.
Going further he tries to explain what constitutes a naval force or, which vessel can be called a warship? The key concern is, that individual states consider the various maritime capabilities at their disposal quite differently which can cause problems when different types of vessels meet at sea in a disputed area. In this context he tries to define maritime hybrid warfare, its key components and presents the statement that maritime hybrid warfare in the broad sense is defined as hybrid warfare which takes place at or from the sea and is conducted primarily through maritime capabilities.
Building on that, Chinese maritime hybrid warfare can specifically be defined as actions of a hybrid actor which employs conventional forces (navy), irregular units (coast guards, militia, civilian fishermen), and other activities (island building, lawfare), brought together through a carefully controlled, opaque merger of conventional and unconventional modes of warfare.
He also focuses on the aspect of time, legal manoeuvring and examines Chinese actions like the Scarborough Shoal stand-off, island building like Subi Reef, Fiery Cross Reef and Mischief Reef, all of which are located within the Spratly Islands group with geo-economic significance. China’s maritime militia as a type of hybrid force has two pairs of activities, the first militia activities and the second conducting ‘rights protection’ missions, The Sansha City maritime militia being particularly interesting because of its formation and operational tempo.
Additionally, to illustrate the activities of maritime militia vessels the author selects three incidents for analysis, the first and most important is the 2012 ‘Scarborough Shoal incident’, the second is the Chinese reaction to the passage of the USS Lassen past Subi Reef in October 2015 and the third is the incident surrounding the USNS Impeccable in March 2009. Another important aspect of hybrid warfare that concerns security experts is legal and regulatory nature of the international system, as exploitation of legality and legitimacy could be a powerful tool for an opponent as Chinese lawfare does.
Finally, the study of China closes with the distinction of kinetic and non-kinetic warfare in the maritime domain, how China itself is not yet fully aware of the potential of hybrid warfare and is testing the waters to see how its opponents respond and where the lines of escalation are drawn. The author’s opinion is that, in the long term it is highly probable that the balance in China’s hybrid warfare will tilt from predominantly non-kinetic to kinetic as it will seek actively to rebalance the prevailing regional order.
In the conclusion, the author offers his view about what is Hybrid warfare and points outs that is a distinct form of low-level conflict, spanning the spectrum of capabilities. It works as a deliberately opaque merger of conventional and unconventional warfare, conducted under the central authority and direction of a state or state-like (very) actor. He continues saying that, even though no individual component of hybrid warfare is new in and of itself, the novelty of hybrid warfare is the way they are brought together.
In this framework the book examined what makes hybrid so interesting by examining the context in which it occurs but also, an adaptation to the larger international system in which it is used. Under such circumstances, the added appeal of hybrid warfare is that it can produce results which would normally require a large-scale conventional conflict, but without the complications that would arise from that. Moreover, he adds that in essence, hybrid warfare is a tool of realpolitik exploiting the liberal tendencies of the international order. The paragraph closes with the example of Ukraine, its complexities, and argues that from the side of Russia the hybrid approach was the best of the available options, and the strategic lesson that this situation offered.
In the final chapter the author gives a short argument about the future of hybrid warfare and specifically four strategic predictions such as, first hybrid warfare is here to stay, second the number of hybrid conflicts across the globe is likely to increase over the course of the next two decades, third the costs of hybrid warfare are going to steadily increase for the actors who use it and those who are its targets, and fourth hybrid warfare will continue to be an influential addition to the character of war but will not change its nature. He closes by arguing, that hybrid warfare is not the future of war, however, the future conduct of war will, at least for the foreseeable future, be hybrid.
As short assessment on the book from the Proorasis team. First, it is a great effort to study this phenomenon for all security / safety related experts. On the other hand, one should consider that the only reason to try and define exactly this phenomenon, has only value for military people because it helps their way of working and mentality. The definitions offered by NATO and EU are enough, because hybrid warfare as it has been already mentioned does not bring anything new in the continuous struggle between states for power, it just presents the evolution in the way of combining tools (especially technology) and types of forces.
With this thinking, the value of the new term is placed especially in an effort to bring focus on a debate about new threats and challenges and how to counter them, not a new type of warfare. Moreover, the author misses to mention the origin of the term as according our research, Frank Hoffman in 2007, followed with the term hybrid threats, he points out the usage of the term hybrid war by Robert G. Walker in an unpublished paper, in an effort to characterize the U.S. expeditionary marine forces he called them “a hybrid power for hybrid wars”, in 1998.
Another important issue is the perception of a threat, it is a fact that different people understand something differently, for example migration is seen in the EU from the one side as a challenge and from the other as a threat, this perspective is missed by the author. Furthermore, the author offers a highly interesting framework to understand hybrid warfare using the Trilogy of Clausewitz, an argument waiting to be proved, if it is useful for countering hybrid threats.
Finally, regarding the author’s four strategic predictions they seem reasonable but, as far as it concerns the assessment that the future conduct of war will, at least for the foreseeable future, be hybrid is wrong, as it seems that the world is turning again to global power competition and the full-scale war in Ukraine proves that hard power is again the most vital ingredient that places hybrid warfare in the side-lines, at least for now.