Finland, has a population of 5.6 million in area of 338,462 km2, an analogy of 18.3 inhabitants per km2, with two official languages (Finnish and Swedish).
A republic with parliamentary democracy, of a 200-member unicameral parliament that celebrates its independence on December 6, 1917. The current Finnish Government comprises 12 ministries. Each ministry is responsible for the preparation of matters within its mandate and for the proper functioning of administration.
The Prime Minister chairs the plenary sessions of the Government and the statutory Ministerial Committees. The central government is based in Helsinki and the local governments in the 309 municipalities (towns and cities). The country is divided into 19 regions and 70 sub-regions. The smallest region, Åland, is an autonomous archipelago in the south-west. The northern Lappi region comprises the Sami Domicile Area, home to around half of Finland’s indigenous Sami people (also known as Lapps or Laplanders).
The War of Finland in 1808-09 brought the transfer of Finland from Swedish rule to become an autonomous grand duchy of the Russian empire. In 1809 the new Grand Duchy of Finland received its own central administration under the leadership of a Governing Council, from 1816 the Imperial Finnish Senate. The Senate, which contained an Economic Division and a Judicial Division, was responsible for the general administration of the Grand Duchy. Both divisions were under the formal chairmanship of the Russian Governor-General.
In order to analyze the core of Finland’s strategic placement, one has to examine the relationship between Finland and its big neighbor, the Russian Federation. Specifically, after its independence Finland fought the Winter War against an invasion by the Soviet Union from 30 Nov 1939 to 13 Mar 1940, in which the country lost almost 9% of its territory even though this result came with heavy losses for the Soviets.
The next war was the Continuation War, together with Germany and the other Axis Powers against the Soviets (in 1941–1944), where Finland tried to change the reality created by the previous war, but unfortunately this choice proved to be wrong. In another view, regarding the Continuation War, someone could argue that both sides could claim benefits, the Soviet side could argue that they had redeemed the humiliation of the Winter War with a powerful, well-planned offensive that knocked Finland out of the war. Finland, on the other side managed to maintain its independence and remain a democratic nation on the borders of the Soviet Union.
Finally, in an effective change of sides, Finland fought the Lapland War against Germany in 1944-1945 which stipulated expulsion of Nazi German forces from Finnish territory. Though Finland did ally with Hitler, it refused to turn over Finnish Jews and this fact saved its international posture from the shame of collaboration with the Axis powers. Finland lost in WWII, but it managed to maintain its independence, its identity and of course peace.
During the following years, Finland found itself in the midst of growing tensions in the Cold War period and in an effort not to be Iphigenia, decided to exercise strict neutrality, enshrined in a 1948 treaty with Moscow, the treaty ensured Finland that unlike other countries in Eastern Europe, it would not face a Soviet invasion, but in return, it agreed to stay out of NATO and allowed the giant next door to exercise significant influence over its domestic and foreign policy. This relationship created a new word in the postwar diplomatic lexicon, the term “Finlandization”.
Although, the term “Finlandization” has taken a negative tone, the status of Finland and its achievements today prove that this policy was effective. Geography is a fact; we do not choose our neighbors usually and if a country manages to move forward successfully, words just come and go. As our world is always on the move and nothing can be considered permanent, Finland’s foreign and security policy environment changed significantly when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
After the invasion, Finland reassessed its security policy situation and applied for NATO membership. Finland became a full member of NATO on 4 April 2023. The main goals of Finland’s foreign and security policy are to safeguard Finland’s independence and territorial integrity, to avoid becoming involved in a military conflict and to improve the security and wellbeing of the people of Finland. Finland works to prevent military threats and to reduce tensions.
Finland’s foreign and security policy is based on the rule of law, human rights, equality and democracy. Close cooperation with partners, good bilateral relations, and respect for and strengthening of multilateral international law are the cornerstones Finland’s international relations. The European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) form the core of Finland’s cooperative foreign policy.
Finland’s accession to NATO does not affect the demilitarized status of Åland, which is based on international conventions. The Åland Islands are part of Finland’s sovereign territory, and defending its neutrality is Finland’s responsibility under the conventions. These conventions are not in conflict with the obligations of the North Atlantic Treaty. Specifically, commenting on the position of Åland, Foreign Minister Pekka Haavisto has said that during the NATO membership process, all international treaties concerning Finland were scanned, and none of them created an obstacle to joining the military alliance.
Regarding international cooperation, Finland sees the United States as a key strategic partner and ally, it has close multi-sectoral links to the United Kingdom and promotes a strong partnership between the UK and the EU. Sweden is the closest partner, while as a member of the Nordic community Finland aims to deepen Nordic integration and dismantle barriers between the Nordic countries. Another important format of coordination is the NB8, that includes the Baltic states and Finland considers highly important to strengthen and deepen Nordic-Baltic cooperation.
China is an important trading partner for Finland, and Finland wants to maintain functioning relations with China. Concerning the challenges that China brings to global relations, Finland’s China policy is determined through Finland’s membership in the European Union and NATO. Other possible partnerships include likeminded nations like Australia, South Korea, Japan, while furthermore interest exists for cooperation with African and Central Asia partners.
Lastly, the elephant in the room for more than a century, with respect to Finland’s destiny in foreign and security positioning is the Russian Federation. Finland’s objective is to get Russia end its war in Ukraine and, together with partners, to repel Russia’s destabilizing aspirations. Depending on developments in Russia, Finland wants to reassess the possibilities for cooperating with Russia together with Finland’s allies in the EU and NATO. Particularly, emphasize is given to maintain and develop Finland’s knowledge of Russia and Finland’s ability to analyze developments in Russia, like for example to support efforts and expand the room for maneuver for civil society in Russia.
In the field of economy, the most important sectors in 2020 were industry (20.3%), public administration, defense, education, human health and social work activities (20.6%) and wholesale and retail trade, transport, accommodation and food services (14.0%).
Intra-EU trade accounts for 55% of Finland’s exports (Germany 14%, Sweden 10% and the Netherlands 7%), while outside the EU 9% go to the United States and 5% to China. In terms of imports, 72% come from EU Member States (Germany and Sweden 17%and the Netherlands 9%), while outside the EU 10% come from Russia and 4% from China.
Finland’s economy will be in recession in the latter part of the year. Due to good growth in the early part of the year, economic growth will remain at zero overall in 2023. Next year, it is estimated that private consumption, investments and exports will start to increase, and GDP will grow 1.2 per cent. The growth of consumption and investments will increase in 2025, and GDP will grow 1.8 per cent. Of course, the forecast of the government includes many risks relating to, for example, construction, household consumption behavior and the global economy. The realization of these risks would delay economic recovery and prolong the recession.
NATO membership will strengthen stability and security in Finland and throughout the Baltic Sea region and Northern Europe, as it has been proven for NATO members for more than 70 years. As a member of the Alliance, Finland is part of NATO’s collective defense and is covered by the security guarantees enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. NATO membership also means that Finland is involved in decision-making on security policy questions that are essential for Finland.
As it is expected, Sweden in the short term will also join NATO, whereas with Finland and Sweden as NATO members, the threshold for using military force in the Baltic Sea region will rise, which will enhance the stability of the region in the long term. Once Finland and Sweden have joined NATO, all of the Nordic countries will be NATO members. This means that the Nordic countries can advocate together for issues important to them within the Alliance.
Under these circumstances, Finland should revise and consider again the demilitarized status of Åland, because a malign actor might want to take advantage of this particular situation. A possible solution might be, a common Nordic defensive task force to secure the area. To that end, a growing number of Finnish citizens demand the Russian consulate in the Capital of Åland, Mariehamn, is shut down as threats to security have started to grow since Finland became NATO’s newest member. So far, the official Finland has not moved forward on the issue.
General conscription and an extensive, well-trained reserve are the foundation of Finland’s defense. NATO membership involves additional direct costs, for example, from participation in the financing of NATO’s common budgets and from the secondment of personnel to NATO’s military command structure. The annual costs are estimated at EUR 70–100 million. In addition, accession to the NATO Defense Planning Process and meeting the capability targets allocated to Finland as well as participating in NATO’s operational planning will cause significant additional costs for Finland.
As a member of NATO, Finland commits to spending approximately two per cent of its GDP on defense in line with NATO’s target. It is estimated that Finland will spend 2.38 per cent of its GDP on defense expenditure in 2023 and around two per cent in 2024 and 2025 as Finland will be financing strategic projects for the Navy and the Air Force. Finland, which became a NATO member in April 2023, has increased its defense budget for 2024 to EUR6.19bn (USD6.58bn). This consolidates the jump made in 2020, when spending surged by roughly 40%. The current figure represents 2.3% of GDP, up from 1.99% in 2021 and 1.53% in 2020.
Finland formalized its acquisition of 64 Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II fighters for its air force in February 2022 at an estimated cost of USD9.4bn. The deal represents Helsinki’s largest military-spending commitment, though other purchases include Pohjanmaa-class corvettes for naval upgrades of the country’s surface fleet, while the Common Armoured Vehicle System (CAVS) remains a priority for the army. Finland is also set to modernize its long-range artillery with the purchase of K9 Thunder 155mm self-propelled howitzers (of Korean origin in this case).
As a member of NATO, Finland aspires to be an active and international NATO country, prepared to receive assistance from and give assistance to its allies. Finland aims to participate fully in all NATO activities, including NATO’s collective peacetime missions. Finland is committed to NATO’s 360-degree approach to deterrence and collective defense across the Alliance. The Government’s goal is that NATO’s planning and structures, and Finland’s positioning in them, will give the best possible support to security in Northern Europe from the Baltic Sea to the Arctic region.
In this vein, Finland will seek to host a NATO organization, for example a centre of excellence. Finland’s profile in NATO will focus on security in the Arctic and Baltic Sea regions, comprehensive security, cyber and information security, countering hybrid threats, artificial intelligence and quantum technology, as major goals among others.
Finland’s defense is based on a strong national defense capability as part of the Alliance’s collective deterrence and defense. The Government should ensure military and administrative integration with NATO, while the Defense Forces must have sufficient personnel and that the personnel is able to cope in the changed operating environment. An increase in the number of required personnel is anticipated and in parallel the percentage of professional military human resources should be soared, taken into consideration possible participation in NATO’s missions globally.
( The Kummakivi is a 500.000kg rock in Finland that has been balancing on top of another rock for 11.000 years).
Comprehensive Security is a Finnish preparedness cooperation model in which the vital functions of society are looked after through cooperation between the authorities, the business community, organizations and citizens. The Security Strategy for Society was last updated in 2017. In parallel, the Ministry of Defense has launched the preparation of a new Government’s Defense Report, that will be submitted to Parliament after the Foreign and Security Policy Report, possibly in the course of 2024.
The Government’s Defense Report sets out defense policy guidelines for maintaining and developing Finland’s defense capability, taking into account the effects of Finland’s NATO membership. The Report discusses the integration of Finland’s defense system into NATO’s collective defense and deterrence and defines guidelines for Finland’s defense policy and military role in the Alliance. The previous Government’s Defense Report 2021, was published by the Finnish Government and the Ministry of Defense, while the recently published national risk assessment 2023 by the Ministry of Interior is set to be the basis for the new policy planning.
As far as it concerns societal resilience, Finland is assessing the current state of how national security is managed at the Government level and plans to direct the necessary steps to structures, administration and forms of political guidance. Moreover, Finland will draw up a national security strategy in which the vulnerabilities of society to wide-ranging influence activities carried out by foreign states will be identified and shortcomings rectified. In this context, the Security Strategy for Society will be reformed to respond to the demands of the new security environment.
Finland has an important governmental body to analyze and produce its strategy, the Security Committee. The Security Committee consists of, the Chair with Permanent Secretary Esa Pulkkinen from the Ministry of Defense and the Secretary of State Risto Artjoki from the Prime Minister’s Office. Moreover, its members include 18 representatives from ministries and governmental authorities and 4 experts.
Whereas the Committee prepares the Security Strategy for Society, one can notice also a role for the government generally, the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior. This complex structure seems to be a little confusing, so the Proorasis team considers that to achieve a common framework, a proposed way for the future might be to integrate all strategy and policy planning effort, in the responsibility of the Security Committee.
The equation for Finland’s security policy has changed, till recently, the combination of strong national defense capability, a close NATO partnership and a network of bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation arrangements served Finland well. After joining NATO, the country shares 1,340 km border, the longest than any other ally, with Russia a declared adversary that has a very different worldview. This fact is and will be in the near- and long-term future a significant challenging ingredient for Finland’s security, especially after the Artic trade corridors open and probably will be used widely.
Furthermore, the country will have to move towards integration with NATO policies and structures, whereas interoperability remains a challenging trail for every member in daily activities. This procedure demands time to mature in governmental bodies as well as in the society as a whole. For example, the Finns are likely ready to defend their homeland with determination but, how they will respond in a situation when the country will have to be deploy forces on South China sea. A special focus should be placed in the phenomenon of free riding in security matters, Finland has proven that it is able to balance between being a security receiver and a security provider.
Finland is a highly developed country, one can easily notice that it scores usually amongst the first, in various objective (as possible) lists and ranking, like the rule of law index, the quality-of-life metrics, the performance of the education system, the standards of living and many more. While the Finns seem to know the way to success, realism should dominate as far as it concerns the footprint of the country in the global stage and the new challenges ahead.
Concluding, the most desirable way to guide the future of Finland should be based on the strength of will, determination and perseverance, all included in a unique word extracted from its own language – “sisu”, as a national driving ambition.
Sources: https://turvallisuuskomitea.fi/en/frontpage/, https://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/frontpage, https://um.fi/frontpage.